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Abstract 
Mobile ad hoc network is a kind of wireless network, in  this network all nodes are connected through the 
wireless links and perform cooperative communication.Due to limited radio range of these devices any time can 
leave or join the network. Therefore the routing techniques are responsible for the network organization and 
communication flow. Due to this the performance of MANET is low as compared with the traditional wired 
communication networks. In addition of that network is suffers from the probability of attacks. Thus in this 
paper MANET routing strategy and their attacks are investigated and learned. In addition of that in order to 
secure the communication recent approaches of security in MANET also investigated. Finally a new algorithm 
for prevention of malicious attack in MANET is suggested. Additionally the based on the concluded facts, 
future extension of the proposed work is also suggested. 
Keywords— MANET, Routing, routing attacks, malicious node detection and prevention 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mobile  ad  hoc  network  is  a  new  generation 
network technology that is self-defined by their name 
ad hoc network. The main advantage of such kind of 
network is their rapid configuration and hurdle free 
operation. The MANET is adoptable in those areas 
where the network management and maintenance is 
complex enough such as remote areas and battle field. 
Due to their advance technique there are no needs to 
install  a  stable  infrastructure  for  organizing  the 
network. Therefore mobile ad hoc network is a group 
of  communication  devices  these  nodes  (network 
devices) are independent to move. The connectivity 
between these nodes is provided using the wireless 
links and any time can leave or join the network. In 
this network the main responsibility for creating and 
organizing the communication routing protocols are 
responsible.  These  protocols  are  help  to  obtain 
optimum path between sender and receiver. Using the 
discovered route the network can transmit data. 
Mobile  ad  hoc  network  supports  a  number  of 
routing protocols; these protocols can be categorized 
in  two  main  domains  active  and  passive  routing 
technique. According to the type of routing technique 
the attack is also categorized as active and passive 
attacks.  An  active  attack  tries  to  modify  the  data 
being  exchanged  during  communication,  by 
disrupting the standard working of the network. It can 
be divided into two categories external attacks and 
internal  attacks.  External  attacks  are  passed  out  by 
nodes  that  do  not  belong  to  the  network.  These 
attacks  can  be  forbidden  using  typical  security 
mechanisms  like  cryptographic  approach  and 
firewalls. Internal attacks are passed out by  
 
compromised  nodes  that  are  actually  part  of  the 
network. Since the attackers are by now part of the 
network,  internal  attacks  are  more  simple  and 
problematic to detect as compared to external attacks. 
A passive attack does not disturb appropriate function 
of  the  network.  The  attacker  sneaks  the  data 
exchanged in the network without altering it. Here, 
the  necessity  of  privacy  can  be  degraded  and  an 
attacker is also able to understand the data gathered 
through  snooping.  Detection  of  passive  attacks  is 
very  tricky  for  the  operation  of  the  network.  A 
technique  of  preventing  such  exertion  is  to  use 
powerful encryption mechanisms to encrypt the data 
being  transmitted;  thereby  making  it  impracticable 
for  eavesdroppers  to  find  any  essential  information 
from the data eavesdropped. 
Therefore in MANET a different kind of attack 
deployment  techniques  are  exist,  but  there  are  two 
most frequent kind of attacks are found in mobile ad 
hoc network according to the literature, but there is 
not  a  single  combined  effort  is  found  for  their 
detection  and  prevention.  In  this  presented  paper  a 
combined  approach  is  developed  for  preventing 
black-hole  and  wormhole  attack.  Therefore  first  in 
next section both attack techniques are explained. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND STUDIES  
In  this  section  black  hole  and  wormhole 
technique is presented additionally how these attacks 
are deployed in network is also discussed in detail. 
 
Worm hole 
In wormhole attack, a tunnel is created between 
two  nodes  that  can  be  used  to  secretly  transmit 
RESEARCH ARTICLE                                OPEN ACCESS Amber Jain Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                                www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 9( Version 1), September 2014, pp.18-22 
  www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                19 | P a g e  
packets. In a wormhole attack, an attacker receives 
packets at one point in the network, tunnels them to 
another point in the network and then replays them 
into  the  network  from  that  point.  For  tunneled 
distances  longer  than  the  normal  wireless 
transmission range of a single hop, it is simple for the 
attacker  to  make  the  tunneled  packet  arrive  sooner 
than other packets transmitted over a normal multi-
hop route, for example through use of a single long 
range  directional  wireless  link  or  through  a  direct 
wired link to a colluding attacker. It is also possible 
for  the  attacker  to  forward  each  bit  over  the 
wormhole  directly,  without  waiting  for  an  entire 
packet to be received before beginning to tunnel the 
bits  of  the  packet,  in  order  to  minimize  delay 
introduced by the wormhole. If the attacker performs 
this tunneling honestly and reliably, no harm is done; 
the  attacker  actually  provides  a  useful  service  in 
connecting  the  network  more  efficiently.  The 
wormhole  attack  is  particularly  dangerous  against 
many ad hoc network routing protocols in which the 
nodes that hear a packet transmission directly from 
some node consider themselves to be in range of (and 
thus  a  neighbor  of)  that  node.  For  example,  when 
used against an on-demand routing protocol such as 
DSR  or  AODV,  a  powerful  application  of  the 
wormhole attack can be mounted by tunneling each 
ROUTE REQUEST packet directly to the destination 
target node of the REQUEST. When the destination 
node's  neighbors  hear  this  REQUEST  packet,  they 
will  follow  normal  routing  protocol  processing  to 
rebroadcast  that  copy  of  the  REQUEST  and  then 
discard without processing all other received ROUTE 
REQUEST packets originating from this same Route 
Discovery [1] [2]. 
 
Figure 1 wormhole attack 
 
Classification of Wormhole Attack 
It  is  difficult  to  detect  such  dangerous  attacks 
and no one can predict what the wormhole nodes can 
do  and  where  and  when.  The  wormhole  attack  is 
invisible at the higher layer and therefore, two end 
points of the wormhole are not visible in the route in 
which  detection  becomes  much  more  complex. 
Wormhole  can  be  classified  into  further  five 
categories as proposed 
•   Wormhole using Encapsulation.  
•   Wormhole using out of band channel.  
•   Open wormhole attack.  
•   Closed wormhole attack.  
•   Half open wormhole attack.  
•   Wormhole with high power transmission. 
 
Black Hole 
In this attack, an attacker advertises a zero metric 
for  all  destinations  causing  all  nodes  around  it  to 
route packets towards it. A malicious node sends fake 
routing information, claiming that it has an optimum 
route  and  causes  other  good  nodes  to  route  data 
packets through the malicious one. A malicious node 
drops all packets that it receives instead of normally 
forwarding  those  packets.  An  attacker  listen  the 
requests in a flooding based protocol.  
In Black hole attack, using routing protocol to an 
attacker advertises itself as the shortest path  to the 
target device. An attacker watches the routes request 
in  a  flooding  based  routing  protocol.  When  the 
attacker receives an appeal for a route to the target 
node,  it  forms  a  respond  involving  of  really  short 
route.  If  the  mischievous  respond  reaches  the 
initiating  node  before  the  reply  from  the  genuine 
node, a fake route gets created. Once the malicious 
device  joins  the  network  itself  among  the 
communicating nodes, it is bright to do anything with 
the  packets  passing  through  them.  It  can  crash  the 
packets between them to perform a denial-of-service 
attack, or on the other hand use its position over the 
route is the first step of man-in-the-middle attack [3]. 
The black hole attack is a well-known security issue 
in  MANET.  The  intruders  develop  the  loophole  to 
deploy  their  malicious  activities  because  the  route 
detection process is necessary and predictable. Many 
researchers  have  conducted  different  detection 
techniques  to  propose  different  types  of  detection 
schemes. 
For example, in Fig. 2, source node S wants to 
send data packets to destination node D and initiates 
the route detection process. Suppose that device 2 is a 
malicious device and it claims that it has a route to 
the  destination  whenever  it  receives  route  request 
packets, and straight away sends the reaction to node 
S. If the reply from the malicious node 2 influences 
firstly  to  node  S,  then  node  S  considers  that  route 
detection is finished, than S ignores all other replies 
and  starts  to  send  data  packets  to  node  2.  As  an 
outcome, all packets through the  malicious node is 
consumed or lost. 
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III.  BLACK HOLE DETECTION 
TECHNIQUES 
There are a large number of studies related to the 
Black  hole  attack  detection  and  prevention 
techniques are available. In order to classify them an 
important contribution placed by [4], in their studies 
they  provide  various  Black  hole  detection  and 
prevention techniques and their description some of 
them are listed in this section. 
 
Neighbourhood-based  and  Routing  Recovery 
Scheme 
Author  claim  that  after  a  slightly  modified  the 
on-demand  routing  like  DSR  can  also  suitably 
applied  over detection  scheme  uses  on  a  neighbor-
hood-based  method.  To  recognize  the  black  hole 
attack  and  a  routing  revival  protocol  to  build  the 
correct path. The  neighbor-hood-based  technique  is 
working  to  identify  the  unsubstantiated  nodes,  and 
the source node sends a Modify Route Entry control 
packet to destination node to renew routing path in 
the recovery protocol. In this organization, not only a 
lower  detection  time  and  higher  throughput  are 
achieved, the precise detection is also achieved. To 
validate the mentioned approach, the routing control 
overhead  does  not  increase.  Conversely,  this 
organization  is  impractical  when  the  attackers 
cooperate to forge the reply packets [4]. 
 
Redundant  Route  Method  and  Unique  Sequence 
Number Scheme 
To find alternative route from the source node to 
target  node,  in  other  words,  there  exist  some 
redundant routes inside the routing path, and authors 
believe  that  there  are  three  routes  at  least  in  the 
scenario. The receiver who has a route, to the target 
will reply this request, and a allow investigation at 
source  node.  After  that  sender  will  store  RREP 
packet till more than two RREP packets are received, 
and  send  the  buffered  packets  after  recognizing  a 
secure route. It demonstrates that there are at lowest 
two  routing  paths  available.  Then,  the  source  node 
distinguishes secure route from the number of hops, 
and avoid black hole attacks. 
 
Time-based Threshold Detection Scheme 
That  is  an  improvement  of  AODV  routing 
protocol.  The  design  concept  is  based  on  a  timer 
setting in the Timer Expired Table for gathering the 
request  from  other  nodes  after  accepting  the  first 
request. It will accrue the packet's sequence number 
and  the  received  time,  counting  the  timeout  value 
based on the arriving time of the first route request, 
inspecting the route valid or not based on the above 
threshold  value.  The  simulation  using  GloMoSim 
reflects that, a higher PDR is gained with negligible 
delay  and  overhead.  However  the  end-to-end  delay 
may affect even when the suspicious device is away 
from the source device. 
 
Next Hop Information Scheme 
This  technique  is  composed  in  two  parts, 
reaction and detection, in first part field next hop is 
introduced in the RREP packet. Earlier source node 
conveys  the  data  packets;  the  RREP  packet  is 
examined  initially  between  intermediate  node  and 
target node. Each node manages BIT, and the fields 
in  his  table.  That  includes  source,  target,  PRC, 
current  node  ID,  PFC,  PMC.  Then  the  PMC  is 
restructured  by  locating  the  BIT  from  their 
neighbours.  If  the  node  acts  correctly,  the 
corresponding  count  value  multiplies.  Then,  a 
malicious  node  can  be  found  out  if  the  number  of 
receiving packets differentiates from sending packets. 
The  second  part  is  separating  the  black  hole,  thus 
each node maintains an IT and stores the black node 
ID. The ID is broadcasted to every node in order to 
eliminate  the  malicious  node  by  checking  the 
isolation table. 
 
IV. WORMHOLE DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
Packet  leashes  [6]  are  available  to  detect  and 
defend against the wormhole attack. In particular, the 
authors  proposed  two  types  of  leashes  first  is 
temporal leashes and second is geographical leashes. 
For the temporal leash approach, each node computes 
the packet expiration time t, based on the speed of 
light  c  and  includes  the  expiration  time,  t,  in  its 
packet  to  prevent  the  packet  from  traveling  further 
than a specific distance, L. The receiver of the packet 
checks  whether  or  not  the  packet  expires  by 
comparing its current time. The author also proposed 
TIK, which is used to authenticate the expiration time 
that  can  otherwise  be  modified  by  the  malicious 
node.  The  main  drawback  of  the  temporal  leash  is 
that it requires all nodes to have tightly synchronized 
clocks. For the geographical leash, each node must 
know its own position and have loosely synchronized 
clocks. In this approach, a sender of a packet includes 
its current position and the sending time. Therefore a 
receiver can judge neighbor relations by computing 
distance between itself and the sender of the packet. 
The advantage of geographic leashes over temporal 
leashes is that the time synchronization needs not to 
be highly tight [5]. 
In  [7],  the  authors  offer  protection  against  a 
wormhole  attack  in  the  OLSR  protocol.  This 
approach  is  based  on  location  information  and 
requires the deployment of a public key infrastructure 
and  time-stamp  synchronization  between  all  nodes 
that is similar to the geographic leashes proposed in 
[6]. In this approach a sender of a HELLO message 
includes its current position  and current time in its 
HELLO message. Upon receiving a HELLO message 
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between itself and its neighbor, based on a position 
provided in the HELLO message. If the distance is 
more than the maximum transmission range, the node 
judges that the HELLO message is highly suspicious 
and might be tunneled by a wormhole attack [5]. 
In  the  authors  propose  a  statistical  analysis  of 
multipath (SAM), which is an approach to detect the 
wormhole  attack  by  using  multipath  routing.  This 
approach  determines  the  attack  by  calculating  the 
relative frequency of each link that appears in all of 
the obtained routes from one route discovery. In this 
solution, alink that has the highest relative frequency 
is identified as the wormhole link. The advantage of 
this approach is that it introduces limited ov erhead 
when applied in multipath routing. However, it might 
not work in a non-multipath routing protocol, such as 
a pure AODV protocol. 
 
V.  PROPOSED WORK 
Mobile ad hoc network is completely dependent 
on  the  routing  techniques  for  communication. 
Therefore any malicious node can join the network 
any time. Thus a secure routing technique is required 
to  design  which  consume  the  route  parameters  for 
finding the secure and optimum route between source 
and target destination. 
Therefore  there  are  two  most  frequent  kind  of 
attack deployments are considered. During black hole 
attack  the  malicious  attacker  attract  most  of  the 
traffic  in  network  and  demonstrate  the  higher  drop 
ratio.  On  the  other  hand  during  the  wormhole 
deployment  the  malicious  route  consumes  higher 
time  as  compared  to  legitimate  route.  Therefore  a 
combine technique which utilizes the RTT (round trip 
time), buffer length and packet drop ratio for network 
routing strategy. The proposed routing algorithm can 
be defined as: 
Let there are N number of nodes in network, a 
node S (source) wants to send data to a targeted node 
D  (destination).  Then  first  source  send  a  control 
message  to  the  target  in  the  same  time  a  timer  is 
initiated  as 𝑇?  and  after  receiving  the  route  reply 
message from destination the time stoped and extract 
the time 𝑇?. Thus between source and destination the 
path distance in terms of hop count is 2Hc. Thus for 
each hop the total time consumption is denoted by Rt 
𝑅? =
𝑇? − 𝑇?
2𝐻?
 
Now,  at  the  time  of  communication  the 
malicious  route  can  prevented  using  the  following 
step. 
1.  Sender send a RREQ message 
2.  Initialize timer 
3.  Receive a RREP then Stop timer 
4.  Calculate Rt 
5.  For each node in routing table in source node 
a.  Transmit a hello packet  
b.  Get time of acknowledgment  
c.  If 𝑎?𝑘?𝑖𝑚? ≤ 𝑅? 
d.  If PDR< threshold 
e.  If buffer_length <  threshold  
i.  Select as next hop 
f.  End if 
g.  End if 
h.  Else 
i.  Return from loop 
j.  End if 
6.  End for 
 
This section demonstrates the proposed routing 
algorithm for securing the communication path from 
the malicious attacker. The next section describes the 
conclusion of the presented paper. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The  given  paper  provides  an  analysis  of  the 
mobile ad hoc network routing techniques and their 
attacks. In addition of that recent development on the 
wormhole and black hole detection technique is also 
studied.  Based  on  the  previous  techniques  a  new 
method  for  both  attack  detection  and  prevention  a 
new routing enhancement is suggested and listed. In 
near  future  the  proposed  work  is  extended  for 
simulation and results analysis during attacks on the 
mobile ad hoc network. 
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